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ABSTRACT 
 
The Brazilian healthcare sector is peculiar. The quality gap of the medical services between 
the public and private providers is significant. The national health system is based on the 
decentralization of medical services. States and municipalities needed to secure the necessary 
resources to provide appropriate medical care for the population. Thus, in September 2010, 
the state of Bahia inaugurated the first Public-Private Partnership hospital in Brazil, Hospital 
do Subúrbio. This thesis presented the case of the hospital and evaluated its success. The 
hospital’s purpose was to combine the quality of the private healthcare with the affordability 
of the public healthcare. The maintenance, management and operation of the hospital were 
outsourced to a private consortium. A review of several models of PPP was conducted for 
Portugal, Spain, Canada and the United Kingdom. Similarities emerged in the length of the 
contract and responsibilities allocated to the private partners. Differences in the provision of 
clinical services and the project finance reflected the differences in the legal framework of 
each country. In the end, an analysis of the performance of the hospital was presented. This 
performance was evaluated using available quantitative and qualitative data provided by the 
private consortium. The analysis revealed defects in the performance forecasts, which had a 
positive impact on the payment to the consortium. The mortality rate of the hospital was 
revealed as a matter for concern. However, the overall positive performance of the hospital 




O setor da saúde no Brasil é peculiar. Por um lado, existe uma diferença significativa de 
qualidade entre os serviços médicos públicos e privados. Por outro lado, o sistema nacional de 
saúde baseia-se na descentralização dos serviços médicos. Estados e município necessitam de 
assegurar os recursos necessários para fornecer à população cuidados médicos apropriados. 
Assim, em setembro de 2010, o estado da Bahia inaugurou o primeiro hospital em Parceria 
Público-Privada no Brasil, o Hospital do Subúrbio. Esta tese apresentou o caso do hospital e 
avaliou o seu sucesso. O objetivo do hospital era juntar a qualidade dos serviços médicos 
privados com a acessibilidade dos serviços médicos públicos. Por essa razão, a manutenção, 
gestão e operação do hospital foram atribuídas a um consórcio privado. Posteriormente, foi 
elaborada uma revisão de vários modelos de PPP para Portugal, Espanha, Canadá e o Reino 
Unido. A duração dos contratos e as responsabilidades dos parceiros apresentaram algumas 
semelhanças. O fornecimento de serviços clínicos e o financiamento dos projetos refletiram as 
diferenças na estrutura legal de cada país. Por fim, foi realizada uma análise do desempenho 
do hospital. Este último foi avaliado com recurso a dados quantitativos e qualitativos 
disponibilizados pelo consórcio privado. A análise revelou defeitos nas previsões de 
desempenho, que tiveram um impacto positivo no pagamento ao consórcio. A taxa de 
mortalidade institucional revelou-se como um motivo de preocupação. No entanto, o 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Public private partnerships (PPPs) originated in the United Kingdom in the 1980’s (Jefferies 
et al., 2013). The earliest form of partnership between private and public entities was the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which was developed under the conservative administration 
of John Major (Brito & Silveira, 2005). The partnership was a mean for a public entity, at the 
state level or municipality level, to fund a specific project with private capital. The terms of 
such partnerships were then extended in the late 1990’s under the government of Tony Blair, 
and the PFI was transformed into the modern day PPP (Brito & Silveira, 2005).  
 
Why were PPPs important for public entities? European countries were experiencing a period 
of fiscal contraction with tight budgets and limited debt to respect the limits imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty. PPPs appeared as a response to the increase in the demand for public 
services while respecting their fiscal constrains and overcoming the struggles of public 
financing (Brito & Silveira, 2005; Jefferies et al, 2013). The private sector was perceived as a 
role model for efficiency. Governments seized the opportunity of bringing efficient services 
to a larger scale without the constraints that could emerge from private sector, such as a high 
price. 
  
This has resulted in impressive numbers for PPP investment, specifically long-term 
infrastructure contract (LTIC) types of PPPs1. From the early-90s to the beginning of this 
century, thousands of contracts were established worldwide with amounts totalling almost 
$200 billion (Hodge & Greve, 2009). At first, PPP projects were focused on transportation. 
Road projects entitled the private operator to remuneration directly from the users, i.e. tolls, or 
remuneration from the government calculated using the number of vehicles, i.e. shadow tolls 
(Jefferies et al., 2013). Portuguese SCUT highways built between 1999 and 2001 were an 
example of shadow tolls remuneration (Sarmento & Reis, 2013) before the model was 
dropped and physical electronic tolls were installed. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hodge & Greve (2009) define LTIC-type of PPPs as projects that “emphasize tight specification of outputs in 
long-term legal contacts”. 
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Over the years, PPPs have evolved to other fields. Allard & Trabant (2008) listed PPP 
projects in Spain. Infrastructures have been developed in solid waste management (Centro de 
Residuos in Cantabria) or railway transportation (Metro Sevilla in Andalucía). Naturally, 
PPPs have been developed in the healthcare provision sector, with examples in the United 
Kingdom (Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital), France (Hôpital Henri Laborit), 
Romenia (University Hospital Bucaresti), Portugal (Hospital Beatriz Ângelo), Spain (Hospital 
Universitario de la Ribera), among many others (EC, 2014). 
 
In the healthcare provision sector, PPPs are commonly associated with hospitals. However, 
PPPs in this sector are not limited to hospitals. Partnerships were established between 
governments and pharmaceuticals to improve the development of proper medicine to tackle 
specific diseases and granting larger access to medical advancements (Liang, 2011). But with 
fully public financed health sectors, high efficiency level targets and restrictive budgets, 
governments were forced to implement reforms to increase the hospitals’ performance 
(Simões, 2004). 
 
PPPs were institutionalized in the Brazilian legislature in 2004. The government was looking 
to replicate the positive aspects from the international experience of PPPs and adapt them to 
the local needs (Brito & Silveira, 2005). Contracts are characterized by the provision of public 
services in the medium-long run under the supervision of the Public Administration (Brito & 
Silveira, 2005). At the federal level, examples of existing PPP projects are: a datacenter, an 
administrative center or a railway line (Ministério do Planejamento, 2015; PPP Brasil, 2015). 
At the state level, examples of PPPs are: football stadiums, hospitals or underground 
transportation. 
 
PPPs have only recently started to reach the Brazilian healthcare sector with the construction 
of the Hospital do Subúrbio in the state of Bahia. The project was accomplished on September 
14, 2010 (SEFAZ Bahia, 2015). Most recently the state has signed a PPP contract in the field 
of image diagnostics in medical units of the state health system (PPP Brasil, 2015). 
Furthermore, the example of this hospital has pushed for replication initiatives in other 
Brazilian states, namely São Paulo and Minas Gerais (PPP Brasil, 2015). This work focuses 
on the PPP project of Hospital do Subúrbio. 
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To assist this research, three questions will need to be answered: 
 
1) How was the Hospital do Subúrbio PPP project designed? 
This research is centred on Hospital do Subúrbio, the first experience of PPP in healthcare in 
Brazil. The central piece of this case is the public-private partnership itself, which has various 
features that are important to analyse. The project starts with a tender, then the partner is 
selected, a contract between partners is established and then both partners must achieve their 
mutual obligations. The aim is to describe this process. 
 
2) How do the different models of PPP in Healthcare compare in different 
countries? 
In the interest of evaluating the Hospital do Súburbio as a PPP it becomes relevant to compare 
the Brazilian model with other PPP models in healthcare provision in other countries. In order 
to perform the comparison, several countries with PPP hospitals were selected. The hospital 
will serve as an example for the country’s PPP model. The selected countries and hospitals 
are: Hospital Beatriz Ângelo in Portugal, Norfolk and Norwich Unviersity Hospital in the 
United Kingdom, Hospital Universitario de la Ribera in Spain and Centre Hospitalier de 
l’Université de Montréal in Canada. 
 
3) Why is Hospital do Subúrbio a successful case study? 
It is important to assess the extent to which this case study can be considered a success or not. 
Studying the performance of the hospital will provide an answer to this question. The 
performance is measured by a set of indicators. The analysis of the later should give a 
perspective of the quality of the hospital, i.e. its success. 
 
In the topic of PPPs it is interesting to have a recent case to study that is a premiere in its 
business area. Particularly when the use of PPPs has been a conventional model for numerous 
countries around the world. Developing countries face a various set of issues that are not a 
concern for developed countries anymore. A successful case in a developing country can 
serve as an example for other countries to replicate. 
 
This work will be organized as follows. The first chapter will present a literature review 
concerning PPPs, PPPs in healthcare and PPPs in Brazil. The methodology will be presented 
in the second chapter. The third chapter will present the case to be studied, thus answering the 
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first research question. Then, the fourth chapter will present a comparison of PPP models in 
selected countries. This chapter will provide an answer to the second research question. Then 
we will proceed onto the analysis of the performance of the Hospital do Subúrbio. And 
finally, the conclusions of this study will be presented in the sixth and last chapter of this 
research. 
 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 1.1 What is a Public-Private Partnership? 
 
Nikolic & Maikisch (2006) distinguished several types of PPPs, or Public-Private 
Collaboration (PPC), depending on the degree of risk and responsibility of each party to the 
contract. On the one hand, there are contracting out types of PPPs. They take various forms 
such as service contract, management contract, construction, maintenance and equipment 
contract, hybrid contracts, or leases. On the other hand, there are concession contracts, 
including the PFI. Table 5 of the appendix provides further explanations for each type of 
contract hereby mentioned. 
 
Among several definitions of the PPP, Grimsey & Lewis (2005) simply define PPPs as “a 
refinement of the private financing initiatives for infrastructure that … describe the provision 
of public assets and services through the participation of the government, the private sector 
and the consumers”. PPPs aim at optimizing the risk management of a large-scale project and 
maximize its Value for Money (Jefferies et al., 2013), thus justifying the evolution of the 
rationale from a traditional provision of assets or services to the acquisition of services from a 
private company (Pollock et al., 1997; Brito & Silveira, 2005, McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009; 
Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012). Although PPPs are not limited to the provision of 
infrastructures/services, they can exist as private ownership of shares in state-owned 
businesses or by exploiting the commercial value of Government assets (McQuaid & 
Scherrer, 2009). 
 
PPP projects need to be clearly defined. They require provisions to share the risk among the 
public authority and the private entity, a contractually limited time frame and a separation 
between the public partner and its private homologous (EC, 2014; Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006). 
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This risk transfer is expressed as the division of the different responsibilities among the 
partners (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). Although risk sharing is an obligation in the PPP 
contract, it also serves as an instrument for the public entity to ensure the creation of the 
appropriate set of incentives for the private partner (EC, 2014; Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006).  
 
The extent to which the risk is transferred to the private part of the contract will depend on the 
incentives needed to successfully achieve the contract and the extent of the risks that the 
public partner has to incur. This risk transfer may imply a cost for the public partner in the 
form of a fixed remuneration. Public authorities need to make sure that by transferring risk, 
they do not transfer unbearable risks (Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006). 
 
PPPs suppose a long-term arrangement between the partners, typically 20-35 years for 
healthcare facilities, as in existing cases in the United Kingdom, Portugal, or Spain (EC 
Annexes, 2014). Such long-term relationships exist under the form of concessions or 
franchises (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009). Among numerous reasons to develop PPPs, 
efficiency of public spending (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009) and comparative advantage in the 
provision of a service (Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006) are distinguished as most important. They 
are stimulated by the integrated vision of the project’s life cycle developed by the private 
partner (Brito & Silveira, 2005) since it is responsible for the whole project, i.e. construction, 
financing and mobilization of the assets needed to provide the required service. 
 
The structure of a PPP project funding follows a rationale of Project Finance (Brito & 
Silveira, 2005). To develop the project, the investors/sponsors create a distinct entity whose 
assets and obligations are distinct from theirs and whose responsibility is solely limited to the 
capital raised for the project (Brito & Silveira, 2005; Gatti, 2005). The distinct entity is known 
as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The debt and/or equity raised, as an initial investment for 
the project, will be paid using the cash flow resulting from the project operation, discounted at 
a rate that compensates for the risk taken by the shareholders (Gatti, 2005). Equity will 
originate from the sponsors, whereas debt can be raised via banks or bond markets (Sarmento 
& Renneboog, 2014). Gatti (2005) also emphasises the fair share of risk among sponsors and 
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 1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of PPPs have been widely discussed and criticized by the 
general public, the media, political parties and several authors. On the positive side, PPPs 
allow for greater efficiency stemming from the private partner experience. They alleviate the 
financial pressure on public entities involved in the partnership. And, they provide a better 
healthcare management. On the negative side, such advantages seem to be rather theoretical 
than actual benefits. PPPs present a set of risks that would otherwise not be faced by the 
public partner. Plus, other types of disadvantages, such as obsolescence of the infrastructure, 
are important to highlight. However it is crucial to emphasize that a main quality of a PPP is 
that it allows for the construction of an infrastructure at all (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). 
 
  1.2.1 Advantages 
 
The core benefit and purpose of PPPs is the increase of efficiency in service provision (Brito 
& Silveira, 2005), facilities operation (Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006) or maintenance (Grilo & 
Alves, 2012). The public entity seeks a private partner that is able to execute a task with 
greater efficiency than it could do (Brito & Silveira, 2005). Partnering with a private company 
seeks to develop greater asset utilisation, economies of scale and better performance with the 
use of key performance indicators (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009). Furthermore, this efficiency 
is verified in the structure of the project, specifically in the SPV. All activities related to the 
project are concentrated in one entity that creates the incentive for cost-optimization and 
improvement of service quality (Brito & Silveira, 2005; Grilo & Alves, 2012). 
 
Public entities seek PPPs as a way to fund their projects and the result for the treasury is an 
“off-balance sheet” operation (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). 
PPPs reduce the amount of up-front investment carried by public funds (Nikolic & Maikisch, 
2006; Brito & Silveira, 2005), as the private partner has to uncover the financial resources to 
initiate the project. This is an example that PPPs allow for a better risk allocation and risk 
reduction (Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006) in this particular case. PPP contracts induce a careful 
risk analysis to procure reliable cost estimates to provide a solid ground for decision makers 
(Grilo & Alves, 2012). In addition, risks are carefully evaluated by the shareholders, thus 
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providing an incentive for proper risk mitigation, namely during the construction phase of a 
project (Grilo & Alves, 2012). 
 
With a specific emphasis on the healthcare sector, PPPs provide a better healthcare 
management, both in the services provided as well as the infrastructure management (Nikolic 
& Maikisch, 2006; Grilo & Alves, 2012). PPPs are a method of leveraging technical or 
managerial expertise as well as enhancing technology transfers through the incentive scheme 
set by the public partner and the performance monitoring of the private operator (Nikolic & 
Maikisch, 2006; McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009). As the contracts contain thresholds of 
performance, this results in adequate infrastructure maintenance (Grilo & Alves, 2012). 
 
  1.2.2 Disadvantages 
 
On the downside, there appear to be no scientific evidence that PPPs in healthcare provision 
are cost-effective compared to any other form of publicly financed entity. Various reports 
suggest that a long-term analysis proves that PPPs are more expensive (EC, 2014). The 
structure of the PPP itself, combined with the bidding process and further monitoring, 
represents elevated costs for the public entity, which will have to account for them in the 
project evaluation (Brito & Silveira, 2005). These high costs, combined with a slow process 
of implementation, increase the difficulty to set up such a framework for small projects (Grilo 
& Alves, 2012). Also, any renegotiation process will also amount to a further increase in costs 
for the public entity (Grilo & Alves, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, PPPs are highly relevant in national economic terms. It was argued that large 
PPP programmes lead to fiscal risk, which is concerning in countries such as the United 
Kingdom where PPPs represent 40% of the total health sector investment (EC, 2014). The 
evaluation of risks, as discussed earlier, can uncover risks resulting from low institutional 
capacity or regulatory framework, or even risks from the creation of excess capacity or new 
capacity in the wrong place (Nikolic & Maikisch, 2006). 
 
Moreover, the evolution of the demand may render the service obsolete or the PPP contract 
inadequate for the changes needed in the project (Grilo & Alves, 2012). New technologies 
may have a negative effect on the projects when innovative techniques in the construction 
techniques are yet to be tested (Grilo & Alves, 2012). Compensation payments for the risk 
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taken by the private partner might cover risks that do not materialize, or risks that the private 
partner cannot deal with (Grilo & Alves, 2012). Also, municipal PPPs may involve higher 
risks due to the knowledge gap existing between the municipality and the private company or 
the state, which should have more knowledge in PPPs through past experiences (McQuaid & 
Scherrer, 2009). 
 
 1.3 Value for Money of Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Value for Money (VfM) in PPPs is defined as a “measure of the extent to which cost savings 
are achieved when delivering a public infrastructure project through a PPP relative to a 
traditional government-led procurement approach” (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012). 
Transferring healthcare service provision from public hands to private hands was seen as the 
logical step to improve the VfM of healthcare facilities, given the advantages discussed 
earlier. However, VfM is difficult to measure due to the subtleties existing in the transfer of 
risk from the public to the private partner (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014). Hodge & Greve 
(2009) reviewed international literature about the Value for Money of PPPs and found 
diverging conclusions. Several authors found empirical evidence of profitability in PPPs. On 
the other hand, other authors found conclusive evidence of the exact opposite. However, 
Hodge & Greve (2009) argue that the reliability of these findings is to be questioned.  
 
The European Commission (2014) has major insights in this topic. The VfM of healthcare 
service provision can only be calculated for a specific patient population in relation to a 
defined alternative. Costs savings and value of completing the project on schedule and 
without cost overruns are large enough to compensate for the risks taken by the private 
contractor. The approach to the project VfM study varies for each country and lacks depth, 
accuracy and objectivity, because sometimes the PPP promoter performs the study. All of 
which does not compare to the fact that some PPPs are implemented without a proper 
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 1.4 Public-Private Partnerships in Healthcare Provision 
 
Private participations in hospitals may take various forms depending on the PPP objectives 
and the population needs, as well as the government’s resources and constraints (Nikolic & 
Maikisch, 2006). The European Commission (2014) distinguished two main types of PPPs 
with regard to healthcare provision services: full-service PPPs (infrastructure and clinical 
service) and accommodation-only PPPs (PFI). Full-service PPPs need to be subjected to the 
same rules of patient access and tariffs to ensure that the patients’ experience does not differ 
considerably from hospitals controlled by other public, private, or social sponsors (EC, 2014). 
Accommodation-only projects are discussed when the public sector lacks the up-front 
investment needed for the construction of facilities resulting from budget restrictions (EC, 
2014). 
 
Before the advent of PPPs, dynamics already existed between the public and private sector. 
Countries that provide healthcare mainly through public entities have to rely on private 
entities to provide some inputs, such as pharmaceuticals and support services (McKee et al., 
2006). By opposition, in some countries, the state is able to influence predominant privately 
owned healthcare provision facilities through regulations and incentives (McKee et al., 2006). 
 
The success in achieving the project objectives relies on the payment structure and incentives. 
The complexity of activities developed in a hospital can also have a major effect on the 
success of the project as, for example, a university hospital presents a higher degree of 
complexity than a local hospital (EC, 2014). To increase the potentiality for success, any PPP 
in healthcare should include clinical staff in the discussion of the project, among other 
stakeholders (EC, 2014), i.e. universities and research funders (McKee et al., 2006). 
Additionally, a serious analysis of costs incurred in the bidding procedure needs to be 
conducted. This step implies large costs for the healthcare provider to develop their tender. A 
cost analysis would avoid such results as fears of insolvency that already occurred in PFI 
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 1.5 Public-Private Partnerships in Brazil 
 
The term PPP is employed for three types of concessions existing in the Brazilian legislature: 
regular concessions, administrative concessions and sponsored concessions (PPP Brasil, 
2015). The definitions of each type of concessions can be found in table 6 of the appendix. 
Two laws regulate the PPPs in Brazil: the Federal act nº 8.987/1995 and nº 11.079/2004 (PPP 
Brasil, 2015; Banco do Brasil, 2015). The first applies to regular concession, whereas the later 
applies to administrative and sponsored concessions (PPP Brasil, 2015; BB, 2015). These 
three forms of concession all share a common characteristic that is proper to PPPs. They 
allow the state to attract private investment to fund infrastructures (PPP Brasil, 2015). 
 
The PPP contract cannot involve monetary values inferior to R$ 20 million, with a duration 
comprised between 5 to 35 years (Portal Brasil, 2015; Brito & Silveira, 2005). The 
partnership can be established between a private partner and the Federal government, the state 
or the municipality (Portal Brasil, 2015). The law also establishes the rules for risk sharing in 
several contexts (Brito & Silveira, 2005). It provides a fundamental mechanism to improve 
the incentive for the private partner to improve the project efficiency. The law defines the 
obligation of payment from the public partner for the service included in the PPP contract, 
with the possibility of having a variable amount to be paid according to performance 
objectives (Brito & Silveira, 2005). 
 
The Brazilian PPP Observatory accounted for seventeen PPPs in 2011 in eight different 
categories: stadiums, sanitation, roads, incarceration facilities, administrative centre, subway 
system, hospital and habitation (Ramos & Marques, 2011). They are located in six of the 
twenty-six Brazilian states, namely Minas Gerais, Bahia, Pernambuco, São Paulo, Rio Grande 
do Norte, Ceará. The projects are elaborated with the Federal Government or the State 
Government. The most represented form of PPP was the construction of stadiums for the 
2014 FIFA World Cup, with 5 stadiums built under a public-private partnership contract 
(Ramos & Marques, 2011). 
 
To this date, the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management accounts for fifteen PPP at 
the Federal level, this includes a Data center, a public digital television network and national 
parks, among others (Ministério do Planejamento, 2015). In the state of Bahia, PPPs were 
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introduced with the state law n°9.290 on the December 27, 2004 (SEFAZ Bahia, 2015). The 
state has currently six PPPs in execution, including the Hospital do Subúrbio, and it has two 
projects under study (SEFAZ Bahia, 2015). 
 
The Brazilian legislature relies on the positive aspects of the international experience in PPPs, 
such as having a central public entity that is responsible for the coordination and 
implementation of the projects (Brito & Silveira, 2005). The law 11.079/2004 defines the 
competencies of the public entity that will be in charge of managing the PPP projects. Such 
entity is composed of representatives of the Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão 
(Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, MP), Ministério da Fazenda (Ministry of 
Finance, MF) and from the Casa Civil da Presidência da República (Civil House of the 
President), under the supervision of the MP (Brito & Silveira, 2005). This central entity has 
the role of defining the services to be contracted using a PPP, as well as the procedures for 
such contracts, and obtain authorizations for the bidding procedure, among others (Brito & 
Silveira, 2005). 
 
 1.6 Healthcare Provision in Brazil 
 
Brazil implemented a national healthcare system, the Sistema Unico de Saúde (SUS, Unique 
Healthcare System), through the federal constitution in 1988 and the 1990 Lei Orgânica da 
Saúde (Organic Health Law) (Travassos et al., 2000; Pinto, Wall, Yu et al., 2012). The SUS 
emerged in a time where the dictatorship was fading away (Jurberg, 2008). It was driven by 
the Reforma Sanitária (Sanitary Reform), which was based on a set of crisis affecting the 
country (Teixeira, 2009). The Brazilian population had poor sanitary conditions, a weak 
healthcare system and a crisis of the medical practice all together (Teixeira, 2009). The health 
reform of 1996 cleared the notion of decentralized universal access to healthcare (Jurberg, 
2008). The federal and state governments are responsible for financing the system, whereas 
the actual service is provided directly by municipalities. In numbers, the SUS serves 
approximately 70% of the Brazilian population (Jurberg, 2008). The remaining population 
seeks private healthcare, because they are able to afford it. 
 
The most important aspect of the SUS is primary care, i.e. promotion of health, prevention, 
treatment and focus on serious diseases (Jurberg, 2008). The government thus created the 
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Estratégia Saúde da Família (Family Health Programme) to achieve its goals of primary 
healthcare provision (Jurberg, 2008). This programme is based on a transdisciplinary vision to 
face health and environmental issues affecting communities (Pinto, Wall, Yu et al., 2012). 
Healthcare is provided directly to people’s homes, in addition to hospitals and clinics 
(Jurgberg, 2008). Health care providers strive to analyse issues on evidence-based practices, 
which would combine research with patient input (Pinto, Wall, Yu et al., 2012). In 2008, the 
Programme accounted for 27.000 teams, serving 5.560 municipalities and each team serving 
approximately 2.000 families or 10.000 people (Jurberg, 2008). The teams have nurses, 
doctors, dentists, and other practitioners according to the local needs. 
 
The Brazilian healthcare providers sector was valued in 2013 at $208 billion and is expected 
to grow past $300 billion in next few years (Marketline, 2014)2. The sector is divided into the 
following categories: outpatient care, inpatient care, medical goods, collective services and 
capital formation, long-term care (MarketLine, 2014). Outpatient care3 represents the biggest 
share of the healthcare providers sector with almost 35% of the sector’s value4, followed by 




In this work we will use the case study methodology to provide a framework for “examining 
contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated” (Yin, 2003). It 
is important to differentiate between a case study that presents an institution or describes a 
phenomenon, which is the model used for this research, and a case study used for teaching 
purposes, to which the concept of case study differs (Yin, 2003). 
 
The case study presents the ability to test theories in a specific case, as well as drawing 
theories from various cases. The output of the case can help generalizing a theory for similar 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003), which serves the scientific purpose of the research. Plus, 
this framework allows the use of different types of information sources, from documents, to 
interviews, archival records, or even physical presence (Yin, 2003), which can complement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Information about the growth of the Brazilian healthcare providers sector can be found in Table 9 of the 
appendix 
3 Outpatient care is defined as the medical care that does not require a patient to be admitted into the hospital. 
4 Table 10 and figure 3 of the appendix provide further insights on each segment’s share of the sector. 
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all together to build a solid case. This author suggests that compiling evidence from multiple 
cases also helps the case become more robust, this is the reason for the introduction of 
evidence from other cases in this research. 
 
Case studies should help answering questions that contain substance and form (Yin, 2003) in 
order to report or explain. The case study should answer questions such as “how”, “what”, 
“why”, “who” (Yin, 2003). Thus, the research questions of this work follow this structure. 
How was the Hospital do Subúrbio PPP project designed? How do the different models of 
PPP in Healthcare compare in different countries? Why is Hospital do Subúrbio a successful 
case study? 
 
Unfortunately the case study presents drawbacks. This type of research study faces a set of 
limitations that can impair the quality of the study. It has been argued by authors that the 
scientific validity of a case study is low because of the nature of the study (Yin, 2003). 
Documentation may contain information that is biased according to the author’s standpoint, 
and it is difficult to verify the veracity of such information. 
 
For this research, various PPP hospital models will be studied. Each hospital was selected for 
their added value to this research. The United Kingdom was the precursor of PPPs. Their PFI 
model is a reference of comparison for all PPP ventures. The country has the widest 
experience in PPPs in healthcare, with more than 130 projects in 20125. In the late 1990’s, 
Portugal began its journey of PPP hospitals with the hospital Amadora-Sintra. It has since 
built four other hospitals using a PPP model that is specific to the country. Spain’s experience 
with PPPs began in the beginning of the last century (Allard & Trabant, 2008; Allard & 
Cheng, 2009) and it evolved onto the provision of healthcare in the late 1990’s. This case 
reinforces this research as the model was used in several healthcare projects in Spain (EC, 
2014) and it is the one model to present an integrated healthcare provision model. Finally, the 
Canadian experience will complement this study, with the controversial case of the Montreal 
University Hospital. The project’s VfM has been criticised ever since by the public mass and 
groups of interest (Carbonneau, 2011). This model includes the merging of three hospitals 
into one location. It is the only model in this research to present a case of centralization of 
services. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Healthcare UK (2013). Retrieved May 21th, 2015 from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266818/07_PPP_28.11.13.pdf 
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3. THE CASE OF HOSPITAL DO SUBURBIO 
 
The Hospital do Subúrbio6 is located in Salvador, capital city of the state of Bahia, in the east 
coast of Brazil. More precisely, it is located in the Súburbio Ferróviário (Ferróviário Suburb) 
of the Periperi district7. It is the first public hospital to be inaugurated in the metropolitan area 
of Salvador, in the last 20 years. The state accounted for 14 million habitants in 2009, with 4 
million located in the metropolitan area8. The hospital was expected to serve one million 
people in this area (Fernandez et al.). Subúrbio Ferróviário is one of the poorest parts of 
Salvador. Plus, the city faces a high level of income disparity among the population and a low 
level of Human Development Index (HDI) relative to that of the state and the country (IFC, 
2013). Access to healthcare services and quality of healthcare services are two notions that 
did not complement each other in this region. 
 
The state of Bahia was not successful in the decentralization of the SUS, as Mara Clécia 
Dantas Souza, special advisor to the Office of the Health Secretary of the state of Bahia, 
explains in a panel discussion9. In 2007, Salvador was one of the few capitals to have medical 
assistance and emergencies in hospitals that were provided by the state and not the 
municipality. This contradicted the decentralization model on which was based the SUS. This 
was the scenario faced by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party) when they were 
elected to govern the state of Bahia. The healthcare system was fragile, investment in 
healthcare was scarce and direct assistance had several issues. However, in 4 years, the party 
was able to build 5 hospitals, which supports their bet on healthcare. 
 
The objectives set by the government of Bahia for this PPP were divided into two segments 
(IFC, 2013). First, there was the desire of allowing the population of Salvador to gain access 
to high quality emergency health services. Then, the hospital would serve as a benchmark 
within the public health system, and then serve as a base for replication in following projects. 
The result was a 298-bed hospital, occupying an area of 19.825m2 that was officially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Figure 9 of the appendix provides a visual representation of the hospital. 
7 Figures 4 to 8 of the appendix provide a visual aid to locate the state, its capital city and the district where the 
hospital is located. 
8 Presentation of Hospital do Subúrbio PPP project. “Apresentação sobre o Projeto de PPP do Hospital do 
Subúrbio”. Retrieved May 26th, 2015 from http://www1.saude.ba.gov.br/hospitaldosuburbio/docs.html 
9 Junior, Á. E., Abrucio, F. L., Souza, M. C. D., & Monteiro, V. C. C. Mesa redonda. A experiência nacional. 
Revista Debates GVsaúde, 22-38. Retrieved May 31st from 
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/debatesgvsaude/article/view/23590/22351 
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inaugurated on September 13, 2010. The number of beds was later increased to 373 in 2012. 
The hospital offers specialized treatment for trauma, orthopaedic and cardiac emergencies, 
and other complex injuries as a complement for traditional emergency services (IFC, 2013). 
Services are divided among the different units of the hospital: hospitalization, pediatrics, 
intensive care unit, semi intensive care and home care. 
 
The state government enlisted the help of the International Financial Corporation (IFC) to 
provide consulting services on PPPs in healthcare provision (IFC, 2013). In 2009, the IFC and 
the government realised several studies including technical studies and a feasibility analysis. 
Together, they managed the bidding procedure, promoted the PPP, drafted the legal 
documents required for the transaction, and structured the later. The bidding procedure took 
place at the Bovespa Stock Exchange in the form of an auction. The winning consortium is 
composed of two companies that operate the hospital under the SPV Prodal Saúde S.A. 
 
The first company is Promedica, a Brazilian expert on healthcare services. It represents 70% 
of the contract and provides all medical procedures (Fernandez et al.). The second company is 
Dalkia, a French company that is in charge of non-medical services and facilities 
management. Its share of the contract is 30% with responsibilities towards the infrastructure, 
hygiene, safety, food, cleaning, among others (Fernandez et al.). The transaction was secured 
on May 28, 2010 for a total investment from the consortium of $32 million for the lifetime of 
the contract (IFC, 2013). In the first year of the project $23 million were already invested, 
leaving $9 million to be invested. 
 
As described by the IFC (2013), the partnership is structured as follows. The concession 
contract is valid for 10 years, with a renewal option for 10 additional years. The public sector 
transferred the following responsibilities to the private sector: clinical and non-clinical service 
operation and management, and facilities equipment and maintenance to meet the highest 
technology standards of private hospitals. At the end of the contract, the ownership of the 
equipment is transferred to the state. Outside the PPP scope laid the construction of the 
building, which resulted in mandatory adjustments of the building (Fernandez et al.). 
 
The payment by the public sector for the services provided by their partners is conditioned to 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative KPIs 
account for 70% of the payment requirement and qualitative KPIs account for the remaining 
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30% (Junior et al.). Payments are done in a monthly basis, and adjusted to the performance 
review of the indicators. All performance indicators are subject to regular auditing, in addition 
to the financial statements audit. 
 
Since it started operating, the hospital has performed 1,8 million medical procedures (IFC, 
2013). Its emergency demand has exceeded forecasts in 50%, in the first year alone. The 
hospital created near 1.500 positions for health professionals (Junior et al.). In 2013, the 
hospital received a prize from the World Bank for being among the 10 best PPPs of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. This year, the hospital is the second place winner of the 2015 
United Nations Public Service Award in the category “Improving the Delivery of Public 
Services” for Latin America and the Carribean10. 
 
4. MODELS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The existing literature identifies several different types of PPPs11. For hospitals, partners have 
to decide which part will build the facilities and maintain them, who will provide the medical 
services and the non-medical services, or even the entity in charge of managing the hospital. 
Several models will be reviewed based on European cases studied by the European 
Commission (2014) and also the research conducted by McKee et al. (2006), to help 
understanding the different possibilities existing in hospital care provision. This will help 
setting a base for the study of the model used for Hospital do Subúrbio and other hospitals. 
 
McKee et al. (2006) distinguish different PPP models in hospital provision according to the 
division of responsibilities and ownership towards the infrastructure and/or the services. The 
first distinction made is whether or not the hospital already exists. If it does, the PPP contract 
takes the form of a franchise, where the public entity outsources the management of the 
hospital to a private company. If the infrastructure has to be built, then the construction, 
operation and ownership of the facilities will be divided between partners. Most often the 
private partner will finance the project, design the hospital, build the infrastructure, and then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 United Nations Public Service Award (2015). Retrieved May 26th, 2015 from: 
http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/UNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1522/language/en-
US/Default.aspx 
11 Zarco-Jasso (2005) identified eight types of PPP contracts basing their analyses on ownership, control and 
funding. Different delivery PPP models are analysed in Duffield, Colin F., 2010, Different delivery models, in 
Carsten Greve and Anthony E. Boardman Graeme A. Hodge, ed.: International handbook on public private 
partnerships (Edward Elgar) 
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operate the hospital. Otherwise, the private partner may build and operate the hospital, thus 
remaining the owner of the infrastructure, and the public authorities will purchase services for 
a fixed duration. At the end of the contract, ownership may remain private, or be transferred 
to the public domain. A special derivation from this type of contract, know as the Alzira 
model12, where the private contractor builds and operates the hospital and has a contract for 
the provision of healthcare for a pre-defined population. And finally, the private contractor 
might lease the infrastructure to the public authority after building it, and a public entity will 
be in charge of managing the hospital. Table 5 of the appendix summarizes the different 
models under the nomenclature used by McKee et al. (2006) in their paper. 
 
To complement this analysis of healthcare PPP models, the European Commission (2014) has 
summarized the different models used in the member states, which are presented in the Table 
8 of the appendix. The models follow the rationale described in the last paragraph and the 
most important difference is the presence or absence of clinical services provision. 
 
After understanding the possible existing PPP models it is important to develop further the 
models used for PPP hospitals in Portugal, United Kingdom, Spain, and Canada, to compare 
them to Hospital do Subúrbio. Also, to provide a direct point of reference for Brazil, a model 
of public consortium will be presented. The information will derive from the EC report (2014) 
and each PPP contract that is available, as well as the tender information and other sources of 
information related to each hospital. The chapter will be concluded with a comparison of the 
different models. 
 
 4.1 Hospital Beatriz Ângelo (HBA), Portugal 
 
The hospital chosen to represent the Portuguese PPP case is the Beatriz Ângelo Hospital in 
Loures. The hospital opened in 2012 with 424 beds to serve a population of 286.000. This 
hospital was part of the second-wave PPP hospitals in Portugal. Other projects included in 
this wave of PPP hospitals were the Cascais Hospital (contract signed in 2008), the Braga 
University Hospital (contract signed in 2009) and the Vila Franca de Xira Hospital (contract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 McKee et al. (2006) and the EC (2014) evaluated the PPP model used in the Alzira (city of Valencia) projects. 
The project has two distinct phases, Alzira 1 and 2, following an anticipated renegotiation (Acerete et al. 2011) 
of the partnership that resulted in the addition of primary care to the contract, among other changes.  
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signed in 2010). They are currently all operational and, with the exception of the Beatriz 
Ângelo Hospital, all are replacement hospitals. 
 
The distinctive characteristic of Portuguese PPP hospital projects is the division into two 
separate contracts. This model is depicted in Table 1 as the Twin SPV model. The state 
establishes one contract, the infrastructure contract, with a private entity for the construction 
and maintenance of the hospital’s infrastructure. Another contract, the clinical contract, is 
valid for the management and operation of clinical and non-clinical services. 
 
For these two contracts, a single national tender was held in 2007. The infrastructure contract 
was awarded to the contractor Mota Engil, which operates through the SPV HL-Sociedade 
Gestora do Edifício, SA. The clinical contract was awarded to the healthcare specialist group 
Espírito Santo Saúde, now Luz Saúde, which operates through the SPV SGHL-Sociedade 
Gestora do Hospital de Loures, SA. The duration of the contract also differs for each contract. 
The infrastructure contract is valid for 30 years, whereas the clinical contract is valid for 10 
years, with a renewal option for 30 years. The total investment for the project was estimated 
to be €135 million. 
 
Risk allocation goes beyond the fact that this project incorporates two PPPs. This process is 
summarized in the following Figure 1. Both SPV rely onto subcontracts to perform several 
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Figure 1 – Risk allocation in the Hospital Beatriz Ângelo PPP project. 
The project is financed using standard project finance. Equity emerges from the shareholders of the parent company, and debt emerges from 
several banks. For the infrastructure contract, the debt is spread over several banks, national and international, to account for availability risk. 
However, for the clinical contract, the majority of the debt emerges from one bank, Banco Espirito Santo, which was part of the same 
conglomerate as Espirito Santo Saúde. 
 
(Source: EC, 2014) 
 
The payment for clinical services provided by SGHL is structured as a “fee-for-service”. 
Payments are made for each medical procedure, together with annual quotas, on a monthly 
basis according to a pre-determined value that is indexed to inflation and complemented at the 
end of the year with a top-up payment. For the infrastructure contract, the payment is made 
according to the availability of infrastructure and equipment and the respective performance. 
A negative performance will induce a deduction in the payment. 
 
 4.2 Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital (NNUH), United Kingdom 
 
PPPs dominate the British health sector. Roughly 90% of hospital infrastructure investment 
arises from PFIs (EC, 2014). PFIs were developed as “ways to increase the scope for private 
financing of capital projects” (EC, 2014). With this ideology, the Government signed a 
project agreement in 1998 for the construction and management of the Norfolk & Norwich 
University Hospital (NNUH), located in Norwich, East Anglia. This was UK’s first academic 
teaching hospital to be built under a PFI. It was designed to replace two hospitals with a 
combined capacity of 1.200 beds. The hospital has a capacity of 987 beds and treats 
approximately 700.000 patients each year. 
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The contract tender was held in 1995. Octagon Healthcare was chosen among the three 
candidates for being able to meet output requirements with the lowest cost. The basic cost for 
the construction of the hospital was £159 million (1998 prices) (EC, 2014). The project was 
predominantly funded through bank finance. Funds are structured by priority, from senior 
debt, to junior (mezzanine) debt and equity at last. The later is only a minimal portion of the 
funds, representing £1 million (EC, 2014). 
 
The lifespan of the contract is commonly said to be 35 years, which is the most common 
duration for such projects. However, the public entity, NHS Foundation Trust, has in fact a 
break option starting at the 35-year mark. The length of the contract for the occupation of the 
hospital is 60 years. Facilities management services have a different type of contract that is re-
evaluated every 5 years with the company in charge. 
 
The contract structure follows a standard PFI model, as announced formerly. The private 
partner is responsible for the design, finance and construction of the hospital. The contract 
suggests a part-operation for facilities management services. The Trust plays a crucial role in 
monitoring the management and operations of the hospital and services that are provided by 
Serco, a subcontractor of Octagon Healthcare and a major player in the consortium. Facilities 
services include such services as cleaning, catering, portering, security, car parking, and 
grounds maintenance. Serco is also responsible for the maintenance of the building, according 
to the standards agreed upon in the contract. Clinical services are provided entirely by the 
public sector. 
 
A rent is paid by the Trust for the occupation and use of the building. Payments to Octagon 
Healthcare are based on a monthly unitary charge, which relates the availability of the 
services to their usage, and covers for the capital and lifecycle costs. A small element of the 
payment scheme is linked to the number of patients admitted into the hospital. In it turn, the 
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 4.3 Hospital Universitario de la Ribera (HUR), Spain 
 
Spain has a historical experience in PPPs, starting in the beginning of the 20th century (Allard 
& Trabant, 2008; Allard & Cheng, 2009). The Hospital Universitario de la Ribera, located in 
Alzira, Valencia, was the first Spanish hospital built under a PPP project. The model used for 
this first wave of healthcare PPP projects became known as the Alzira model. The hospital 
was expected to serve a population of 250.000 with a capacity of 300 beds. The contract was 
renegotiated two years after the beginning of activities in the hospital. It was deemed unviable 
and forced a bailout from the public entity responsible for the project. The two phases of this 
PPP are referred to as Alzira 1 and Alzira 2. The information provided reflects the current 
situation, and differences between the phases will be duly mentioned. 
 
Only one bidder presented an offer for the project and was automatically awarded the project. 
Several companies formed a consortium called the Ribera UTE. Only national companies 
participated in this union: medical insurer Adeslas SA, healthcare provider Ribera Salud SA, 
and construction companies Dragados and Lubasa. The project was funded using bank loans 
from savings banks that were stakeholders of the main sponsors. The total investment for this 
project was evaluated in €140 million. 
 
The contract was similar to an administrative concession, as it involved outsourcing the 
responsibilities of building, financing and managing the hospital. The private partner becomes 
responsible for full health service provision and primary care. The initial contract duration 
was 10 years. After the renegotiation, the contract is now binding for 15 years with an 
extension option to 20 years. 
 
An innovative system was developed for the private partner payment. An annual capitation 
fee was set in the contract. However, the fee used in the first phase of the project was 
relatively low and indexed to consumer inflation. After the renegotiation, the fee was revised 
upwards of three times its original value. The current capitation fee is indexed to the 
population’s health expenditure, which provides a more accurate metric for the fee 
calculation. Rents are paid for the infrastructure and support services, i.e. non-clinical 
services. 
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 4.4 Centre Hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), Canada 
 
Following the desire from the Minister of Health and Social Services to have a French 
university hospital centre13, in 1996, the Montreal University Hospital Center was born. The 
CHUM derives from the fusion of three hospitals: Hôpital Saint-Luc, Hôtel-Dieu and Hôpital 
Notre-Dame14. The project for the renovation of the hospital and the centralization of its 
services started in 2011 and is expected to end in 2020. It has been qualified as the largest 
PPP project in all the Canadian history. 
 
The new 772-bed hospital will be located in downtown Montreal, in the exact same location 
as the current Hôpital Saint-Luc. This project will imply the demolition of the later hospital, 
when the first phase of the new CHUM is complete in 201615. The first phase includes the 
construction of a thermal power station and the hospital, with both clinical and non-clinical 
facilities (85 % of ambulatory care facilities, logistic services, etc.). The second phase will 
include the remaining 15% of ambulatory care facility, a library, the administrative services 
facility and an auditorium. 
 
The contract was awarded to a consortium of companies after the 2009 tender. The Collectif 
Santé Montréal consortium is composed of local and foreign companies. The four partners are 
Innisfree Santé Montréal Inc., OHL Santé Montréal Inc., Explore Santé Montréal Inc. and 
Dalkia Santé Montréal Inc. They have invested approximately 2 million CAD for this project.  
 
The project was financed through standard project finance. The sale of covered bonds totalled 
1,37 billion. This innovative financing technique was awarded with two prizes, in Canada and 
the USA16. Another 180 million were obtained from bank loans and equity from the partner 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Canadian PPP Project Database. Retrieved May 20th, 2015 from 
http://projects.pppcouncil.ca/ccppp/src/public/project?project_id=34&scope=view&timeStamp=17e62166fc858
6dfa4d1bc0e1742c08b&pageid=3d067bedfe2f4677470dd6ccf64d05ed 
14 Construction Santé Montréal – Aperçu. Retrieved May 20th, 2015 from 
http://www.constructionsantemontreal.ca/apercu/ 
15 Construction Santé Montréal – Phasage et Livrables. Retrieved May 20th, 2015 from 
http://www.constructionsantemontreal.ca/phasage-et-livrables/ 
16 Conseil Canadien pour les partenariats public-privé: le prix Or 2012 pour le financement du nouveau CHUM. 
Retrieved May 20th, 2015 from http://www.chumontreal.qc.ca/salle-de-presse/medias/communiques/conseil-
canadien-pour-les-partenariats-public-prive-le-prix-or 
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companies. The hospital financed part of the project with 300 million CAD that will be 
generated through the hospital foundation and parking revenue17.  
 
The partnership includes the design, construction, financing, and maintenance of the hospital. 
Maintenance is awarded to Dalkia for a period of 30 years and involves both the infrastructure 
and the equipment. The payment structure to the private partners includes a monthly payment 
for all services and the energy usage from the thermal power station. Also, an annual payment 
accounts for balance differences and lifecycle costs. The value of payments differs for the two 
phases of the project. 
 
 4.5 Consórcios de Saúde (CS), Brazil 
 
This subpart will present a type of public procurement of healthcare services in the state of 
Bahia known as the Healthcare Consortium18. This will complement the analysis by adding a 
public healthcare procurement model that is different from the standard public procurement 
model. Similar to a PPP model, this procurement model seeks to solve issues with the 
standard model19, such as lowering operational costs or facilitating the access to healthcare 
services to the population. The decree-law n° 6.017/2007 instituted this consortium model. 10 
consortiums are expected to be in place by 201620. 
 
The consortium works as a non-profit association between two, or more, public entities. The 
partnership can be horizontal, thus an association of municipalities or states. Or it can be 
vertical, an association between a municipality and the state or a union. In the state of Bahia, 
the partnerships are exclusively between municipalities with a mandatory participation of the 
state as well. This is done to alleviate the financial burden of maintenance and respond to the 
difficulty of the municipalities to allocate the needed financial resources21. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Construction du nouveau CHUM, signature de l’entente de partenariat entre le CHUM et le Collectif Santé 
Montréal. Retrieved May 20th, 2015 from http://www.chumontreal.qc.ca/salle-de-
presse/medias/communiques/construction-du-nouveau-chum-signature-de-l-entente-de 
18 Consórcios de Saúde. Retrieved May 21th, 2015 from 
http://www.saude.ba.gov.br/novoportal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9133%3Aconsorcios-
de-saude&catid=31%3Aestrutura-de-atendimento&Itemid=31 
19 Consórcios de Saúde. Retrieved May 21th, 2015 from http://www.saude.ba.gov.br/consorcios/ 
20 Consórcios de Saúde – Apresentação. Retrieved May 21th, 2015 from 
http://www.saude.ba.gov.br/novoportal/images/stories/PDF/Apresentacao_consorcios_saude.pdf 
21 Consórcio de Saúde – Manual de Orientação Retrieved May 21th, 2015 from 
http://www.saude.ba.gov.br/novoportal/images/stories/PDF/Manual_consorcios_saude.pdf 
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The state builds a fully furnished polyclinic, which costs $R12 million. This facility is 
expected to serve a population of 500.000 spread over the two partnering municipalities. The 
maintenance costs are supported by the municipalities and equally divided among them. 
These costs are estimated to be approximately R$ 700.000. In general, the state is responsible 
for financing 40% of the project, while municipalities are responsible for financing the 
remaining 60%. This last percentage has to be divided according to the proportion of the 
population from each municipality that the polyclinic is serving. The financial risk is then 
spread among several parties, instead of being concentrated in one municipality who does not 
have the appropriate capacity to deal with it. 
 
This method is a response to the decentralization forced by the Brazilian national health 
system, SUS, which allows for the adaptation of the project to the local reality that is often 
similar in adjacent municipalities. The consortium enforces the cooperation between entities 
and the joint management of the project. 
 
 4.6 Comparison of the different Models 
 
The information gathered in this chapter can be summarized in one table to provide assistance 
for the direct comparison of the different models used in the hospitals studied. The following 
Table 1 will include the five PPP hospitals and the public consortium that were developed in 
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Table 1 – Comparison of the different models of hospitals in different countries 
This table provides 10 different points of comparison of the hospitals. The private partners can either be national or international 
companies/consortiums. The project may be financed through bonds, equity, bank loans, or a combination of different resources. The 
construction, maintenance, operation and management of the hospital can be divided among the partners, or not included in the contract. 
Clinical and non-clinical services can be separated and provided by different entities. The length of the contract varies from a project to 
another, but similarities may occur. The payment to the private partner might be done as a result of the number of patients treated, of 
performance indicators, or pre-determined at the time of the elaboration of the contract. 
  
First, the table shows that countries with a longer experience in healthcare PPPs resort to 
national companies for their projects. The Project Finance takes different forms in the 
different models, with a different combination of financial resources. Bank loans represent the 
largest part of the financing, as opposed to equity. However, the Canadian experience 
demonstrates an emphasis on bonds as the main financing tool. 
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The construction of the infrastructure is often included as part of the project. In Brazil, the 
state is in charge of the construction of the hospital, whether or not a PPP project is used. 
When operations and management are included in the contract as responsibilities for the 
private partner, the later will thus provide all the services in the hospital, whether they are 
clinical or non-clinical. The exception lies within the British case, where clinical services are 
entirely allocated to the public entity. Thus, both partners accomplish operations and 
management. 
 
The contract for infrastructure is usually around 30 years, with the exception of the Spanish 
case. Management/operations/maintenance contracts are usually shorter, around 10 years, 
depending on the requirements from public authorities. Finally, the payment structure always 
starts with a pre-determined annual fee, but the actual amount may vary. This variation is 
reported differently in each case. In Brazil, payment is linked to key performance indicators. 
The UK will rely on the usage and availability of services. Portugal, Spain and Canada have a 
similar structure. Portugal and Canada use payments related to the services provided with an 
adjustment at the end of the year, whereas as Spain relies on a payment per patient. 
 
In the specific case of Brazil, a PPP hospital seems to be the best solution for large hospitals 
that operate in very populated cities. Healthcare consortiums present a suitable model for 
small municipalities, which need specific services and have small populations. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE OF THE HOSPITAL 
 
Performance is measured in order to calculate the appropriate amount to be paid to the private 
consortium each quarter. This requires the use of several indicators divided into two main 
categories: qualitative indicators and quantitative indicators. These indicators result from a 
technical report conducted by the Professor Doctor Gilson Caleman (2009).  
 
Quantitative indicators are subdivided into three categories: Hospitalization, 
Emergency/Clinic and Diagnostics. Qualitative indicators used for this performance study 
describe the quality and performance of health services given to patients. The following 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise all quantitative and qualitative performance indicators that are 
available for public consultation. Other qualitative indicators refer to: operational auditing, 
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clinic management, insertion in the SUS, human resources management, social control 
performance, humanization performance and accreditation. Numerical information about the 
indicators was collected each quarter starting from September 14, 201022. 
 
Table 2 – Quantitative Indicators 
 
(Source: author, based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Table 3 – Qualitative Indicators 
 
(Source: author, based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Table 12 of the appendix provides the dates of beginning and end of each quarter. 
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To interpret the performance indicators, it is necessary to understand the figures provided. 
Table 11 of the appendix presents all information provided about the KPIs for the last quarter 
that ended on March 13th, 2015. Forecasts are defined as a threshold for the different services 
and then compared to the actual numbers. This gives us a percentage of the real numbers over 
the forecast. The performance is considered to be positive if results are above 100% and 
negative if results are below 100%. Forecasts were set in the first year and many were revised 
each quarter until the seventh quarter. All the forecasts have remained constant since. 
 
 5.1 Payment Structure 
 
The payment terms between partners need to be clearly understood in order to relate the 
performance to the payment. The payment is done on a monthly basis. The maximum value of 
one month payment for the beginning of the project is R$ 8.625.000, which at the end of the 
year totals R$ 103.500.000. The value of the payment was adjusted after the first quarter of 
activity. As said before, 70% of the payment is bounded to quantitative indicators and the 
remaining 30% to the qualitative indicators. 
 
For quantitative indicators, the payment is based on the three categories: Hospitalization, 
Emergency/Clinic, and Diagnostics. Each category is assigned with a specific weight in the 
formula, which results in a total of 100%. The weight of each activity is a function of the cost 
of the activity relative to the total cost of the hospital. The formula used to calculate the 
monthly payment based on the quantitative indicators is 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =   𝐾!  ×  𝑤!  ×  70%  ×  8.625.000 
 
K1 represents the percentage of requirement fulfilment of each category of indicators, w1 
represents the weight of each category and 70% is the weight of quantitative indicators in the 
payment. The percentage of the indicators is determined by an interval system23. For example, 
if the percentage of the indicator is comprised between 95% and 99,99%, the percentage used 
in the formula will be 99%. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Table 14 of the appendix. 
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For qualitative indicators, this formula system is very similar. Each indicator is awarded with 
a specific percentage weight in relation with its importance24. The indicators used for this 
performance study currently account for 38% of the qualitative performance indicators, with 
the most part being attributed to the quality of medical care. In the first year, quality of 
medical care, operational auditing and performance of medical care were the most important 
indicators, in that order. From the third year onwards, the quality of medical care is still the 
most important indicator. However, accreditation of the hospital now represents 20% of the 
qualitative indicators and human resource management is now the third most important 
indicator. 
 
Satisfying the requirements for an indicator will be awarded with the percentage of this 
indicator, which will be represented in the formula by K2. The sum of all the indicator 
percentages will be used to define the percentage to include in the formula, with the use of a 
similar interval system25. The formula used for qualitative indicators is 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐾!  ×  30%  ×  8.635.000 
 
Taking into account that, currently, the indicators for the performance and quality of medical 
care account for 38% of the total qualitative indicators, the maximum amount based on the 
indicators evaluated in this study becomes 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 38%  ×  30%  ×  8.635.000 = 984.390 
 
 5.2 Quantitative Performance Indicators 
 
Before making an in-depth analysis of each quantitative performance indicator, the three 
categories will be evaluated. The following Figure 2 provides a visual help for this analysis. 
The analysis of the real percentage of the indicators can provide a ground for critics to the 
forecast calculation. Low forecasts will automatically force real percentages to be above 
100% and thus enforcing the full payment to the private partner. They could also mislead the 
supervisor of the project and hide potential errors in the hospital operation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Details of the weight of each qualitative indicator can be found in Tables 16, 17 and 18 of the appendix, for 
the first, second and following years of activity of the hospital. 
25 Table 15 of the appendix. 
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  5.2.1 Analysis of the Three Categories of Quantitative Indicators 
 
Figure 2 – Quantitative Performance Indicators 
This figure presents the evolution of the three categories of quantitative indicators. The figure clearly shows two patterns that result from the 
revision of forecasts used for the calculation of indicators. This forecast revision was done gradually throughout the first six quarters and was 
finalized by the seventh quarter. Before the seventh quarter, the performance was highly positive, which resulted in a full payment from the 
public authorities to the private partner. These results may have forced a revision of the forecasts, because they did not reflect the reality of 
the performance and allowed the private operator to easily surpass those forecasts. Currently, the overall performance is still positive, but not 
all indicators are above 100%. 
 
(Source: author, based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Until the seventh quarter, all quantitative performance indicators display positive results. 
Diagnostics indicators were close to 300% from the fourth quarter to the sixth quarter. After 
the seventh quarter, the indicator remains mostly above 100% with smaller variations. 
Emergency and Clinic indicators were comprised between 100% and 200% for the first three 
years of the hospital, and decreasing below 100% until today. Hospitalization indicators are 
consistently above 100% and close to 150% for most part of the life of the hospital. These 
observations mean that the payment to the private partner was impacted by the forecast 
revision and this has become an incentive to increase the performance. As forecasts were 
inadequate, with an underestimation of the number of patients, this would translate as a 
simple way for the private consortium to be entitled to full payments for at least 70% of the 
total payment value. After the revision, there was conversion of indicators to 100%, meaning 
that forecasts come close to the reality experienced. Nevertheless, the hospital performs better 
in hospitalization, which accounts for 2/3 of the payment related to quantitative indicators. 
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  5.2.2 Analysis of each Quantitative Indicator 
 
To deepen the analysis, Figures 10 and 11 of the appendix provide a visual representation of 
the evolution of the Hospitalization indicators. Indicators such as the real percentage of 
patients in the medical clinic and the surgery clinic are well above 100%, with the former 
being systematically comprised between 200% and 350%. The indicator for adult intensive 
care unit (ICU) was above 100% for the first year and has been negative since. The indicator 
for ICU pediatrics goes back and forth on positive and negative performances. Other 
indicators have been for the major part under 100%, such as home care, pediatrics, and the 
second indicator for medical clinic and surgery clinic. The later indicator replaced both 
indicators for semi intensive care, which had had bad performances. 
 
Emergency/Clinic indicators follow opposite paths as shown in Figure 12 of the appendix. 
Until the seventh quarter, indicators for emergency services and appointments, triage and 
reception show extremely positive results. Indicators were close to 450% in the first quarter, 
which exposes a default in the patient forecast. Indicators for outpatient services were on the 
contrary well below expectations, which is reasonable as the services gathered in the indicator 
require a certain adaptation from the patients. After the seventh semester, there was a change 
in the trend, as the outpatient services indicators increase beyond 100% and the other 
indicators decrease to negative performance levels after the twelfth quarter. 
 
Diagnostics indicators display both positive and negative performances, as shown in Figures 
13 and 14 of the appendix. Until the seventh quarter, indicators for clinical laboratories, 
radiology and CT scans were registering positive performances. Clinical laboratories results 
were almost five times as high as the forecasts before their adjusment. The MRI indicator did 
not register any result for the first three quarters, but has since increased and has showed 
positive results for the last three years, always around 150%. To contrast with these results, 
indicators for hemodynamic and anatomical pathology had some of the lowest results, with 
the majority of the quarters presenting a result of 0. This means that these diagnostic methods 
were not used for any patient during that time frame. The three last diagnostic indicators 
present overall negative performances. The indicators in question are ECG 
(electrocardiography) & EEG (electroencephalography), diagnostic sonography and 
endoscopy. With the forecasts revision, the indicator for the number of ECG & EEG has 
registered positive performances, just above 100%. 
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 5.3 Qualitative Performance Indicators 
 
Qualitative indicators provide an insight on the quality and performance of the medical care 
that is offered to patients. Indicators are compared to thresholds, either maximum values or 
minimum values, in order to provide an overview of the performance. Indicators are 
computed with different formulas, which are detailed in Table 13 of the appendix. We will 
start by reviewing the performance of medical care. 
 
The first indicator to be analysed is the substitution interval26, which measures the idleness of 
the hospital beds. This indicator is continuously below its expected threshold of 1 day, and 
has reached negative levels below -1 day. This indicates a high occupancy rate and that 
patients seek the hospital for small procedures rather than procedures that require a longer 
period of stay. 
 
The renewal index27 describes the amount of discharges in comparison to the total number of 
hospital beds. This translates the number of patients that use the same bed during a defined 
period. The results for this indicator are extremely positive. The minimum threshold for this 
indicator is set at 4,9, and the indicator is mostly four times as high and increasing for the last 
year. The hospital is able to accommodate patients and have a high patient turnover, which is 
consistent with the substitution interval indicator. 
 
The solvability index28 measures the percentage of discharges for patients that were admitted 
in the emergency services for observations. Between the sixth and twelfth quarters, the 
indicator was below the minimum value. However, it has mostly been just above the threshold 
for the major part, especially for the last year. This should not be considered as a bad 
performance, but rather an alert to remind that efforts need to be made in order to ensure the 
necessary turnover to maintain this indicator at desired levels. 
 
The treatment rate29 describes the percentage of patients that do not require immediate 
medical care. The indicator is expected to be lower than 10%. It decreased from the second 
quarter to the seventh quarter, and has remained below the threshold since the third quarter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Figure 15 of the appendix. 
27 Figure 16 of the appendix. 
28 Figure 17 of the appendix. 
29 Figure 18 of the appendix 
	   	   33	  
Results are exceeding expectations for this indicator, even with some fluctuation in the 
indicator lately. 
 
The interval of time between emergency surgeries is an important indicator. It measures the 
agility of the surgery teams. Negative results directly influence the overall output of the 
hospital and have great impact in the perceived quality of the hospital. The analysis of this 
indicator is divided into two parts that are provided in Figures 19 and 20 of the appendix. The 
indicator is expected to be below 60 minutes in 90% of the cases. Until the seventh quarter, 
the indicator was measured in minutes. After the seventh quarter, the indicator was measured 
as a percentage of the cases where the indicator was lower than 60 minutes. 
 
Until the sixth quarter, the time interval between emergency surgeries was below 60 minutes. 
However, on the seventh quarter the indicator was almost 10 times greater than it should have 
been. Since then, the indicator shows that the time interval is lower than 60 minutes for a 
lower than recommended percentage of the cases. Disregarding the result for the seventh 
quarter, which could be due to abnormal delays or the lack of appropriate resources to 
conduct the surgeries on time, the time interval between surgeries has not been small enough 
in the majority of cases. Including the fact that the indicator for the surgery clinic has been 
increasing during the same period, as seen in the previous discussion about quantitative 
indicators, the time interval between surgeries should have decreased instead of the opposite.  
This can be related with a poor management of the surgery clinic. 
 
The ICU return rate30 measures the percentage of adult patients who return to the ICU during 
their hospital stay after already being admitted in the intensive care unit once. The indicator 
displays a positive performance by remaining under its maximum acceptable level of 2,3%. It 
is fair to infer that the quality of care given in the hospital’s intensive care unit is efficient so 
as to prevent the return of patients. 
 
The density of infections is measured using two indicators; the first measures the global 
density of hospital-acquired infections31 and the second measures the density of infections 
associated with the central venous catheter 32  (CVC). The former displays a positive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Figure 21 of the appendix 
31 Figure 22 of the appendix 
32 Figure 23 of the appendix 
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performance, by remaining under half of the maximum threshold, and the later presents mixed 
results. The density of infections in the bloodstream associated with the CVC has exceeded 
the maximum value, with a staggering negative performance in the fifth quarter. The majority 
of quarters present a positive performance; consequently the overall result for this indicator is 
not concerning. A special attention needs to be set for this indicator that can indicate either a 
default in the staff’s training, or an inappropriate environment for the patient. 
 
The last set of indicators all relate to the mortality rate of the hospital. The overall mortality 
rate of the hospital is depicted in Figure 24 of the appendix. This indicator illustrates a major 
flaw in the performance if this hospital. The mortality rate has been increasing beyond its 
maximum threshold and is now three times as high. This is the biggest issue that the hospital 
has to deal with. Similarly to the other indicators, the threshold for this indicator was set 
according to the technical report by Professor Doctor Caleman (2009). For the mortality rate, 
the threshold of 3% was based on studies that showed an average mortality rate of 2,21% for 
88 hospitals in 2008, as well as a World Bank study of 2003 of 12 hospitals in São Paulo that 
displayed an average rate of mortality of 3,8%. This hospital is thus expected to present a 
lower mortality rate for the future. 
 
The surgery mortality rate was computed for the first five quarters as one indicator and was 
divided into two indicators after the seventh quarter: mortality rate during surgery and post 
surgery mortality rate. The mortality rate during surgery33 presents many variations, but 
remains mostly under its threshold. The post surgery mortality rate34 displays very good 
results as it presents results around 0,5%, which is smaller than the maximum threshold. 
 
Several indicators describe diseases-related mortality rates. The mortality rate associated with 
acute myocardial infarction 35  is under the threshold, which translates into a positive 
performance. The stroke mortality rate36 had a positive performance until the thirteenth 
quarter, but has since kept on increasing and it is now above its threshold. This explains in 
part the results for the overall mortality rate. The sepsis mortality rate37 presents also negative 
results with an increasing trend of the indicator since the fifth quarter. The indicator is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Figure 25 of the appendix 
34 Figure 26 of the appendix 
35 Figure 27 of the appendix 
36 Figure 28 of the appendix 
37 Figure 29 of the appendix 
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currently well beyond the maximum acceptable value, with a mortality rate close to 45%. This 
result has a great impact in the mortality rate of the hospital. The hospital needs to implement 
changes to counter this trend, which may be the principal cause for a poor performance in 
regard to the mortality rate. 
 
The hospital presents an overall good quality of its services, given the threshold defined for 
each. However, the mortality rate  
 
Due to the missing information concerning the remaining qualitative indicators, it is not 
possible to perform any analysis on the impact of the indicators onto the amount paid to the 
hospital operator. However, it is important to remember some of recommendations and alerts 
that this analysis of indicators had brought. The performance of the majority of the indicators 
is positive, and in certain case it is beyond expectations. Yet a special attention needs to be set 
for the density of infection, specifically for infections related to the CVC, as well as the time 
interval between surgeries. Most importantly, may become an issue for the hospital. As 
opposed to many other indicators, everyone easily understands this indicator and this can have 
an effect on the reputation of the hospital. Efforts made to improve this indicator can bring the 
performance of the hospital to such good levels that could make this PPP model even more 




As a response to an increasing demand for appropriate healthcare services, the state of Bahia 
in Brazil decided to rely on the international experience and invest in a hybrid procurement 
model. Forming a partnership with private companies would alleviate the financial pressure 
on the public treasury, give access to better healthcare services to the majority of the 
population and increase the efficiency of healthcare provision. A transition country such as 
Brazil needs to invest in different public infrastructures and services to improve the living 
conditions of its population. It becomes important that such projects have positive outcomes, 
because states will not always be able to support directly every public project. 
 
The literature helped understanding the origins of PPPs. The concept was defined; the 
advantages and disadvantages were discussed alongside the critical notion of Value for 
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Money of such projects. The PPP experience in Brazil was detailed, alongside the evolution 
of healthcare in the country. The case of the Hospital do Subúrbio was presented, and the 
model of the PPP was developed. The private consortium operates the hospital through an 
administrative concession contract. Its responsibilities were, first, equipping the hospital, and 
then operate and manage the clinical and non-clinical services of the hospital, as well as 
maintaining the facility. This private consortium is remunerated for its service provision 
according to key performance indicators analysed by the public authorities. These findings 
have provided an answer for the first research question: How was the Hospital do Subúrbio 
PPP designed? 
 
Then, an extensive analysis of several other cases of hospital PPPs was made. Examples 
emerged from Portugal, Spain, Canada and the United Kingdom. More experienced countries 
outsourced the hospital’s construction and maintenance to the private partner. Bank finance 
appears as the main type of financing, equity as the less representative, and inovative forms of 
debt finance using covered bonds arise. Contracts are longer when the infrastructure 
construction is included. And in the Brazilian case, healthcare consortiums represent an 
alternative to the standard public procurement model and the PPP model, for smaller 
municipalities. These findings answered the second research question: How do the different 
models of PPP in healthcare compare in different countries? 
 
Finally, the hospital’s performance was evaluated. This last chapter answered the last research 
question: Why is Hospital do Subúrbio a successful case study? At the beginning, the number 
of patients was greatly exceeding expectations. And most of the qualitative performance 
indicators displayed positive results. However, the initial forecasts were inadequate and 
resulted in payments to the private partner of the full amount agreed upon in the contract. If 
forecasts were appropriate, this might not have been the case and the state could have saved 
money. Furthermore, the management team of the hospital needs to be aware of certain 
negative aspects that exist in the time interval between surgery and in the density of hospital 
infection. Aggravating results in these indicators could be extremely negative for the hospital 
and impact other performance indicators. Also, mortality rate indicators are too high 
compared with expectations. This project is expected to perform better in this area than other 
hospitals. Any improvement will greatly benefit this project and the future prospects of 
replication in other Brazilian states, because the overview on the performance of the hospital 
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is greatly positive. The hospital has been exceeding expectations, and delivering outstanding 
services to the population. 
 
Putting aside the performance review, the hospital does provide an access to proper healthcare 
services with technologically advanced equipment to a population that could not afford these 
services because they were mostly available through private healthcare. This research does 
not contrary the general opinion about the success of this PPP, whether it is through the 
awards received or the media exposure. The PPP does appear to be a success and any effort of 
replication should be encouraged and appreciated by companies as an investment opportunity. 
Any improvement for the performance that was suggested by this research will definitely 
confirm the success of this project. 
 
Limitations in this research arise in the analysis of performance indicators, as information for 
7 categories of qualitative indicators is not available. Patient reviews of the hospital are 
included in these indicators, and they would be useful to prove or disprove the conclusion of 
this research. Additionally, a more extensive comparison of PPP models could help design a 
model for PPP hospitals with great odds of success based on the feedback from 20 years of 
experience in PPP hospitals worldwide. 
 
When all qualitative performance indicators are available for public consultation, future 
research could be done to evaluate the performance of the hospital and the performance of the 
hospital’s management structure. Research can be done to evaluate the extent to which the 
PPP fulfils its financial purpose by comparing this hospital directly to similar public and 
private hospitals. This would determine the true Value for Money of the Hospital do 
Subúrbio. And strictly in a healthcare standpoint, an analysis of the impact of the hospital on 
the population’s health can be conducted to discover if in fact the hospital provides the decent 
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APPENDIX 
 
 1. Definitions 
 
Table 5 – Definition of several types of PPP/PPC contracts 
Service Contracts 
Public authorities reach a private entity for the 
provision of a given service of which the private 
partner demonstrates a comparative advantage 
Management Contracts 
This contract includes the transfer of authority from 
the public partner to the private partner to manage a 
public facility and provide a service 
Construction, Maintenance and 
Equipment Contracts 
These contracts typically involve the development, 
refurbishment or maintenance of a facility 
Hybrid Contracts 
Such contracts may involve a variety of elements 
present in the above defined contracts to serve a 
specific need or situation  
Leases 
The private entity pays a fee to its public 
homologous to manage and operate a public facility 
in exchange for the revenues originated from the 
facility’s exploitation 
Concessions 
This arrangement states that the facility remains a 
public ownership, with the private partner being 
responsible for needed investment and activities of 
operation and maintenance 
Private Finance Initiatives 
Typically involves a concession contract. In the UK, 
private consortia enter in a long-term contract with 
the government to finance, build, and manage new 
projects. 
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Table 6 – Definition of the three types concessions according to the Brazilian legislature  
Regular concession 
The user fees reward directly the private partner for the 
investment done in providing a service. 
Administrative 
concession 
In the case where it is not convenient, nor possible to charge 
user fees for a certain type of service, the private partner 
receives regular inflows of budgetary funds from the public 
sector, which would have been agreed upon in the contract. 
Sponsored concession 
In addition to user fees, the government complements the 
private partner with awards through systematic budget funds. 
This is done because the fees are not sufficient to offset the 
investment made by the private partner. 
(Source: author based on information available at PPP Brazil, 2015) 
 
Table 7 – Models of Public-Private Partnership in Hospital provision (McKee et al., 2006). 
Model Description 
Franchising 
Public authority contracts a private company to manage 
existing hospital 
DBFO (Desing, Build,  
Finance, Operate) 
Private consortium designs facilities based on public 
authority’s specified requirements, builds the facility, 
finances the capital cost and operates their facilities 
BOO (Build, Own, 
Operate) 
Public authority purchases services for fixed period (say 30 
years) after which ownership remains with private provider 
BOOT (Build, Own, 
Operate, Transfer) 
Public authority purchases services for fixed period after 
which ownership reverts to public authority 
BOLB (Build, Own, 
Lease back) 
Private contractor builds hospital; facility is leased back and 
managed by public authority 
Alzira Model 
Private contractor builds and operates hospital, with contract 
to provide care for a defined population 
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Table 8 – Models of PPP in the Health Sector in EU Member States 
Type Description 
1) Accommodation Model Hospital infrastructure and hard facility management 
(Many PFI) 
2) Accommodation model As Type 1), but with the SPV owned entirely from the start 
by the public sector 
(e.g. Hospital Universitario Central de Asturias) 
3) Extended Accommodation 
Model 
As Type 2), but including IT, soft facilities management, 
and supply, installation and maintenance of some or all 
medical equipment 
(Several PFI) 
4) Twin-SPV Model Joint venture with separate infrastructure (~PFI) and clinical 
service companies 
(e.g. Portuguese “Wave 1” hospitals like Loures) 
5) Accommodation and Service 
Model 
Specialist “monoproduct” hospital infrastructure with 
facilities management and medical services 
(e.g. Coxa, Dialysis Centres and ISTC) 
6) Full service provision 
secondary health care model 
General (district hospital) infrastructure with facilities 
management and medical services 
(Most of the sites in the German hospital chains) 
7) Full service franchise 
provision tertiary health care 
model with teaching and R&D 
University (teaching/research, “tertiary”) hospital 
infrastructure with facilities management and medical 
services 
(e.g. Berlin Buch/Helios or Giessen & Marburg/Rhön) 
8) Full service provision at all 
levels of care 
Integrated hospital and community/primary care 
(e.g. the Ribera Salud/Alzira companies) 
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 2. Brazilian Healthcare Providers Sector 
 
Table 9 – Brazil healthcare providers sector value from 2009 to 2013 ($ billion) 
Year $ billion BRL billion € billion % Growth 
2009 131,4 283,6 98,9  
2010 157,4 339,6 118,4 19,8% 
2011 170,9 368 128,5 8,5% 
2012 190,0 409,9 142,9 11,2% 
2013 208,0 448,7 156,4 9,5% 
     
CAGR: 2009-13    12,2% 
(Source: author based information available in Marketline, 2014) 
 
Table 10 – Brazil healthcare providers sector category segmentation in 2013 ($ billion) 
Category 2013 % 
Outpatient care 72,5 34,9% 
Inpatient care 58,9 28,3% 
Medical goods 48,2 23,2% 
Collective services and 
capital formation 
18,0 8,7% 
Long-term care 10,3 5,0% 
   
Total 207,9 100% 
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Figure 3 – Brazil healthcare providers sector category segmentation in 2013 (%share) 
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 3. Geographical Maps 
 




Figure 5 – Map of the state of Bahia 
 
(Source: https://maps.google.com) 
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 4. Key Performance Indicators 
 
Table 11 – Key Performance Indicators from December 14th, 2014 to March 13th, 2015 
KPIs   Year 5 
    18th Quarter 
Qualitative   14/12/2014 - 13/03/2015 
  Substitution Interval (in days) -1,1 
  Renewal Index 29,2 
  Solvability Index 92,60% 
  Treatment Rate (non-urgent) 0,80% 
  
Time interval to realize an emergency surgery (in 
minutes) 77,4 
  Intensive Care Unit (ICU) return rate 0,20% 
  Global density of hospital infection (/1000) 5,9 
  
Density of hospital infection associated with the 
central venous catheter (/1000) 3,6 
  Mortality Rate 8,75% 
  Surgery Mortality Rate 0,00% 
  Post Surgery Mortality Rate 0,30% 
  Acute Myocardial Infarction Mortality Rate 11% 
  Stroke Mortality Rate 10,90% 
  Ischemic Stroke Mortality Rate 5,50% 
  Mortality Rate of patients with Sepsis 42,90% 
Quantitative   Forecast Real 
Real 
Percentage 
Hospitalization   5.009,00 7.323,00 146,20% 
  Medical Clinic 1.419,00 2.607,00 183,72% 
  Surgery Clinic 946,00 3.181,00 336,26% 
  Pediatrics 1.051,00 617,00 58,71% 
  ICU Adult 578,00 499,00 86,33% 
  ICU Pediatrics 116,00 112,00 96,55% 
  Home Care 162,00 108,00 66,67% 
  Medical Clinic / Surgery Clinic II 737,00 199,00 27,00% 
Emergency/Clinic   53.254,00 43.004,00 80,75% 
  Emergency Service 15.500,00 11.447,00 73,85% 
  Appointment / Triage / Reception 33.000,00 24.328,00 73,72% 
  
Outpatient clinical appointments: urology, 
orthopedics, neurosurgery 2.717,00 3.590,00 132,13% 
  Outpatient surgical and orthopedics procedures 2.037,00 3.639,00 178,65% 
Diagnostics   63.366,00 69.324,00 109,40% 
  Clinical lab 45.000,00 48.421,00 107,60% 
  Radiology 10.100,00 12.850,00 127,23% 
  Anatomical Pathology 0,00 23,00 
   Diagnostic sonography 2.100,00 1.368,00 65,14%
  MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) 360,00 570,00 158,33% 
  CT Scan (Computerized Tomography Scan) 3.450,00 4.229,00 122,58% 
  Endoscopy 230,00 73,00 31,74% 
  
ECG (Electrocardiography) & EEG 
(Electroencephalography) 1.730,00 1.715,00 99,13% 
  Hemodynamics 396,00 75,00 18,94% 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
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Table 12 – List of the Quarters for the Key Performance Indicators 
Quarter Period Quarter Period 
1 14/09/2010 - 12/12/2010 10 14/12/2012 - 13/03/2013 
2 14/12/2010 - 13/03/2011 11 14/03/2013 - 12/06/2013 
3 14/03/2011 - 13/06/2011 12 14/06/2013 - 13/09/2013 
4 14/06/2011 - 13/09/2011 13 14/09/2013 - 13/12/2013 
5 14/09/2011 - 13/12/2011 14 14/12/2013 - 13/03/2014 
6 14/12/2011 - 13/03/2012 15 14/03/2014 - 13/06/2014 
7 14/03/2012 - 13/06/2012 16 14/06/2014 - 13/09/2014 
8 14/06/2012 - 13/09/2012 17 14/09/2014 - 13/12/2014 
9 14/09/2012 - 13/12/2012 18 14/12/2014 - 13/03/2015 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 





1 − 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒   ×  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
Renewal Index                    
(Indice de Renovação) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠
 
Solvability Index          
(Indice de 
Resolubilidade) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠  𝑢𝑝  𝑡𝑜  5  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠
  ×  100 
Treatment Rate            
(Taxa de Atendimento de 
Usuários em Regime de 
Não Urgência e 
Emergência) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   𝑛𝑜𝑛  𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
  ×100 
 
Time Interval for an 
Emergency Surgery    
(Intervalo de tempo para 
Realização de Cirurgia 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑    
𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  
𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒  𝑎𝑛  𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦 
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de Emergência)  
ICU - Adult Return 
Rate   (Taxa de 
Reingresso na UTI-
Adulto Durante a 
Mesma Internação) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐼𝐶𝑈  𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠  𝑖𝑛  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒  ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐼𝐶𝑈  𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠
  
×  100 
Global Density of 
Hospital-Acquired 
Infection 
(Densidade Global de 
Infecção Hospitalar) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠




associated with the 
Central Venous 
Catheter in the ICU-
Adult 
(Densidade de Infecção 
Hospitalar Associada a 
Cateter Venoso Central 
na UTI Adulto) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ  𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦  𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠  𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
×  1000 
Institutional Mortality 
Rate (Taxa de 
Mortalidade 
Institucional) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑎  24ℎ  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠
  ×  100 
Surgery Mortality Rate 
(Mortalidade 
Operatória) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
  ×  100 
Post Surgery Mortality 
Rate 
(Taxa de Mortalidade no 
Pós-operatório) 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑢𝑝  𝑡𝑜  24ℎ  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
  ×  100 





(Taxa de Mortalidade 
por Infarto Agudo do 
Miocárdio) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑏𝑦  𝐴𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒  𝑀𝑦𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑀𝐼
  ×  100 
Stroke Mortality Rate 
(Taxa de Mortalidade do 
Acidente Vascular 
Cerebral) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑏𝑦  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒





(Taxa de Mortalidade 
por Acidente Vascular 
Cerebral isquêmico) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑏𝑦  𝐼𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐼. 𝑆.
  ×  100 
Mortality Rate of 
Patients with Sepsis 
(Taxa de Mortalidade de 
Clientes com Sepse) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠  𝑏𝑦  𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑠
  
×  100 
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Table 14 – Payment value based on the quantitative performance indicators 
Medical 
Activity 
Indicator Percentage Payment Value 
Hospitalization 
≥ 100% 100% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 95% to 99,99% 99% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 90% to 94,99% 97% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 85% to 89,99% 95% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 80% to 84,99% 93% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 75% to 79,99% 88% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
≤ 74,99% 83% x 72,45% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
Emergency / 
Clinic 
≥ 100% 100% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 95% to 99,99% 99% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 90% to 94,99% 97% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 85% to 89,99% 95% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 80% to 84,99% 93% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 75% to 79,99% 88% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
≤ 74,99% 83% x 21,00% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
Diagnostics 
≥ 100% 100% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 95% to 99,99% 99% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 90% to 94,99% 97% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 85% to 89,99% 95% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 80% to 84,99% 93% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
From 75% to 79,99% 88% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
≤ 74,99% 83% x 6,55% x 70% x Monthly Payment 
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Table 15 – Payment value based on the qualitative indicators 
Indicator Percentage Payment Value 
From 95% to 100% 100% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
From 90% to 94,99% 98% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
From 85% to 89,99% 95% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
From 80% to 84,99% 85% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
From 75% to 79,99% 80% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
From 70% to 74,99% 75% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
≤ 70% 70% x 30% x Monthly Payment 
(Source: author based on information available in the Hospital do Subúrbio PPP contract) 
 










Operational Audit 18% 18% 18% 12% 
Medical Care Performance 16% 16% 16% 12% 
Medical Care Quality 32% 32% 32% 36% 
Clinic Management 4% 4% 4% 6% 
Insertion in the SUS 6% 6% 6% 10% 
Human Resources Management 12% 12% 12% 12% 
Social Control 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Humanization 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Accreditation 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Operational Audit 12% 12% 6% 6% 
Medical Care Performance 12% 12% 6% 6% 
Medical Care Quality 36% 36% 32% 32% 
Clinic Management 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Insertion in the SUS 10% 10% 8% 8% 
Human Resources Management 12% 12% 10% 10% 
Social Control 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Humanization 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Accreditation 0% 0% 20% 20% 
(Source: author, based on information available in Caleman, 2009) 
 










Operational Audit 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Medical Care Performance 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Medical Care Quality 32% 32% 32% 32% 
Clinic Management 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Insertion in the SUS 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Human Resources Management 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Social Control 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Humanization 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Accreditation 20% 20% 20% 20% 
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Figure 10 – Hospitalization Performance Indicators, Part 1 (real percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 11 – Hospitalization Performance Indicators, Part 2 (real percentage) 
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Figure 12 – Emergency/Clinic Performance Indicators (real percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 13 – Diagnostics Performance Indicators, Part 1 (real percentage) 
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Figure 14 – Diagnostics Performance Indicators, Part 2 (real percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 15 – Substitution Interval (days) 
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Figure 16 – Renewal Index (patients) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 17 – Solvability Index (percentage) 
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Figure 18 – Treatment Rate (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 19 – Time interval between emergency surgeries, Part 1 (minutes) 
 






	   	   61	  
 
Figure 20 – Time Interval between Emergency Surgeries, Part 2 (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 21 – ICU Return Rate 
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Figure 22 – Global Density of Hospital Acquired Infection (number of infections) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 23 – Density of Infection associated with Central Venous Catheter (number of 
infectons) 
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Figure 24 – Mortality Rate (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 25 – Mortality Rate During Surgery (percentage) 
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Figure 26 – Post Surgery Mortality Rate (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 27 – Mortality Rate by Acute Myocardial Infarction (percentage) 
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Figure 28 – Mortality Rate by Stroke (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
Figure 29 – Mortality Rate of Patients with Sepsis (percentage) 
 
(Source: author based on information available at http://www.prodalsaude.com.br/?page_id=4568) 
 
